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Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
WILLIAM M. JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellants 
D. DAVID LAMBERT and 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellee 
COMES NOW Steinfeldt, by and through counsel, William M. Jeffs, of the firm of 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C., and files a brief in Response to Reeves Petition for Rehearing as 
requested by the Court. Steinfeldt's Response to Reeves Petition for Rehearing is as follows: 
REEVES FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY ASK THAT ATTORNEY FEES BE AWARDED IN 
THE CROSS-APPEAL AND, COURT HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Reeves's Petition for Rehearing refers to Reeves's Motion to Dismiss filed on May 10, 
1995. They referred to this Motion and Memorandum as specifically requesting attorney fees 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18. See Motion to Dismiss, attached as Exhibit "A". The 
Motion and Memorandum fails to specifically request attorney fees in any way. Reeves Reply 
Memorandum in support of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion For 
Reconsideration, filed on May 23, 1995, attached as Exhibit "B," also does not mention or 
specifically ask that attorney fees be awarded to the Reeves. 
The Response Brief of Appellees and Brief of Cross-Appellants filed by the Reeves on 
August 15, 1995 contains one sentence that refers to the awarding of attorney fees, but that 
statement was referring to Steinfeldt's request for attorney fees on his appeal. The Response 
Brief of Appellee's states on page 18, "The award of attorney fees to Reeves as a defending 
successful party was permissible under the statute." This statement is in Reeves's brief 
responding to Steinfeldt's Request for Attorney Fees and is not in and of itself a request for 
attorney fees on the part of Reeves. Reeves did not in the filing of the Brief of Appellee or in 
his cross appeal ask this court for an award of attorney fees. It is not appropriate, as a Petition 
for Rehearing to now, for the first time, ask for attorney fees on the appeal. Reeves was 
arguing to sustain the award from the trial court. 
In the opinion of this court, ruling on the appeal and cross appeal, the panel did not 
award attorney fees to Reeves. The panel could have awarded the attorney fees if they had felt 
it was appropriate to award such fees and if the request for attorney fees had been a part of the 
appeal. Reeves failed to make any affirmative requests for fees in any pleading before the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Steinfeldt requests that the Petition for Rehearing be denied and the request 
for attorney fees also be denied. 
DATED AND SIGNED this % day of April, 1996. 
id A • in j 
William M. Jeffs 
I hereby certify that the original and six copies of Appellant's Response to Petition for 
Rehearing were mailed to the Utah Court of Appeals and two true and correct copies of the same 
were sent to the below named party, with postage pre-paid thereon, this ±z day of 
April, 1996, addressed as follows: 
D. David Lambert 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
William M. Jeffs 
EXHIBIT "A" 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872) and 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile (801) 377-4991 
J:\pel\reeves.msd 
Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plai n tiffs- A ppel lees, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 950132-CA 
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 23, plaintiffs-appellees Shawn and Julie Reeves move this court 
to dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to reconsider the 
dismissal of their cross-appeal. This motion is accompanied by a supporting memorandum. 
r. —*• 
MAY 1 1 1995 
DATED this ]Q_ day of May, 1995. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to the following this l ^ d a y of May, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
REEVES' MOTION TO DISMISS OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 950132-CA 
Plaintiffs-appellees Shawn and Julie Reeves have moved this court to dismiss Steinfeldt's 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to reconsider the dismissal of their cross-
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The argument that Reeves raise is jurisdictional, and thus may be considered by this 
Court at this time. Indeed, a jurisdictional argument can even be raised at oral argument. 
MAY 1 1 1995 
Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). The Reeves' argument is 
predicated on the timing of Steinfeldt's notice of appeal. A chronology of this case's docket is 
appropriate: 
1. September 12, 1994. Memorandum decision issued in which Reeves' motion for 
partial summary judgment is granted, counsel to prepare an appropriate order. 
2. October 17, 1994. Memorandum decision issued after trial which substantially 
favored Reeves. Reeves' counsel to prepare an appropriate order. 
3. October 25, 1994. Steinfeldt's "Motion for Reconsideration" is filed. 
4. November 4, 1994. Judge Harding signs the Judgment and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Order was submitted to court by Reeves' counsel on October 27, 1994). 
5. November 8, 1994. Steinfeldt's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law filed. 
6. December 2, 1994. Judge Harding signs an Order granting Steinfeldt's ex parte 
motion for an extension of time to file notice of appeal. 
7. December 17, 1994. Judge Harding issues a Memorandum Decision denying 
Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration. Reeves' counsel to submit an appropriate order. 
8. December 27, 1994. Notice of appeal filed. 
9. January 3, 1995. Judge Harding signs an Order disposing of Steinfeldt's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Objection. 
2 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a notice of appeal may be filed 
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." A notice of 
appeal filed "after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of 
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the date 
thereof," U.R.A.P. 4(c), provided, however, that "[a] notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of [a Rule 59 motion for a new trial] shall have no effect." U.R.A.P. 4(b). 
In this case a "Motion for Reconsideration", brought ostensibly under U.R.C.P. 54 (see 
the motion's supporting memorandum), was filed after announcement of the court's decision but 
before the signing of the final order. At first blush it seems that a notice of appeal would have 
been timely filed before November 4, 1994 under Rule 4(c)'s saving clause. That all changed, 
however, when the court issued its final order on November 4, 1994 without disposing of the 
outstanding motion. 
Perhaps there was no way of knowing whether the November 4 Order disposed of the 
motion, but the court's December 17, 1994 removed any doubt that the court did not consider 
the motion to be a Rule 54 motion, but rather a Rule 59 motion. This is the only appropriate 
course it could take given the timing of its rulings. 
Even were this not so, Steinfeldt's "objection", filed four days after the entry of the 
court's November 4 Order, was clearly a Rule 59 motion. "Regardless of how it is captioned, 
a motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the 
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either Rules 
3 
52(b) or 59(e)." Debry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); see Brunetti v. Mascaro. 854 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Given these facts, Steinfeldt could not have timely filed his notice of appeal until 
January 3, 1995, or within thirty days after that date. Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah. 
889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). This is true even considering Judge Harding's granting of the 
extension of time to file the notice of appeal. The notice was ineffective given the pending post-
judgment motion. Because Steinfeldt did not file a timely notice of appeal, his appeal must be 
dismissed. See U.R. A.P. 2 (provisions of Rule 4(b) may not be suspended). 
If the Court is not persuaded by this analysis, the fact remains that a final order 
disposing of this case was not filed until January 3, 1995. That means that the period for filing 
a cross-appeal (accepting that a valid notice of appeal was filed) began to run on January 3, 
1995. U.R.A.P. 4(d)("[A]ny other party may file a notice of appeal . . . within the time 
otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule . . . ."). The notice of cross-appeal was filed 
on January 11, well within the thirty-day time limit. Thus, the notice of cross-appeal should be 
deemed timely and the cross-appeal reinstated. 
DATED this l ^ d a y of May, 1995. 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to the following this J ^ d a y of May, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
ATTOR 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872) and 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 950132-CA 
Plaintiffs-appellees Shawn and Julie Reeves reply to Steinfeldt's Memorandum in 
Opposition. 
ARGUMENT 
L The Chronology is Substantively Correct 
The Reeves acknowledge that the December Memorandum Decision was issued on 
December 8, not December 17. This was an oversight caused by the confusion of the date of 
I MAY 2 4 1995 
| JEFFS & JEFFS I 
the October 17 decision and the December decision, and the Reeves apologize for any confusion 
this may have caused the Court. 
In any event, the mixed dates are a mere curiosity, as they do nothing to affect the 
substance of the Reeves' arguments. Steinfeldt contends that he "had no knowledge as to when 
Plaintiffs submitted the Order to the Court for signature." This is irrelevant. Steinfeldt knew 
that the Order was pending, and it was his duty to be diligent and check with the clerk's office, 
every day if need be, to ensure that any further documents were filed by him before the filing 
of the Order. Notice of the Order was not required for the time for filing a notice of appeal to 
accrue. See U.R.C.P. 58A(d)('The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the signing 
or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service of such notice with the 
clerk of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirements of this provision. "Xemphzsis supplied); Workman v. Nagle. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
2. The Motion for Reconsideration Was a Rule 59 Motion. 
Steinfeldt states that in his motion for reconsideration he was "only asking for a 
reconsideration of the Judge's Memorandum Decision." This is essentially an assertion of an 
error in law. U.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). It is irrelevant how a party styles its motion. What is 
important is how the court treats the motion. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1991). Here, the court did not dispose of the motion for reconsideration until after 
2 
the Order had been signed. The Court, therefore, obviously treated the motion as a Rule 59(b) 
motion. 
Steinfeldt suggests that such an approach is inequitable. This is not true. It is his duty, 
once again, to determine what motions have been disposed of upon entry of what is presumably 
a final Order. If there is any doubt as to whether a motion remains outstanding, the party 
should request a ruling, perhaps moving alternatively for an extension of the time to appeal. It 
is unfortunate that courts at times fail to give sufficient guidance as to what their rulings mean, 
but it is the appellant's responsibility to be diligent in finding the answers to any questions left 
unanswered. That is what this Court and the Supreme Court have required. See, e.g.. 
Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah. 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). 
3. The Objections Were a Rule 59 Motion. 
Steinfeldt cites no authority for his argument that the Objections he filed were not a 
post-judgment motion, and does nothing to rebut the authority cited by Reeves. Indeed, 
Steinfeldt has resorted to a "no notice" argument. This is surprising, given that Reeves 
attempted such an argument in trying to preserve their cross-appeal (the argument was that 
because the distinction between "filing" and "service" is ambiguous and a trap for the unwary, 
a notice of cross-appeal filed more than ten days after filing but before ten days after service 
should be deemed timely based upon excusable neglect). This Court rejected argument. Why? 
Because when a time period runs from the time of filing, actual notice is irrelevant^ Since the 
court's docket is a public record, a party is always on constructive notice of a filing. 
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Steinfeldt claims that adopting such an approach means that "Defendant may be required 
to file a new Notice of Appeal or lose the appeal." Steinfeldt is exactly right, and has expertly 
stated the Supreme Court's ruling in Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1994). As for the second prong of Steinfeldt's "dilemma" (one must wait for the signed Order 
to file the notice of appeal and, if it is not deemed a Rule 59 motion, the notice is deemed 
untimely), a solution was suggested above: file a request for a ruling pled alternatively with an 
request for extension of time to file the appeal. Steinfeldt filed a request for extension below, 
but omitted a request for ruling. It is his fault for failing to ask the court for a clarification as 
to whether the Motion for Reconsideration had been disposed of. 
4. Reeves' Motion for Reconsideration is Proper. 
This Court raised its jurisdiction over Reeves' cross-appeal sua sponte, and dismissed 
the cross-appeal on the grounds that the notice of cross-appeal was not filed within ten days of 
the December 27 notice of appeal. Reeves have pointed out to this Court that the final Order 
in the case was not signed until January 3, and thus the cross-appeal was timely. Steinfeldt has 
argued nothing substantive to the contrary. 
5. Sanctions. 
It is not in Reeves' interest to prolong this appeal, and they have no intention to do so. 
Rule 33(b) clearly requires some kind of nefarious intent, and such has not been demonstrated. 
Attorneys often think of their best arguments on the way from the courthouse, and should not 
be punished for raising meritorious arguments as long as there are procedural grounds for doing 
4 
so. Jurisdictional arguments may be raised at any time-in Swenson they were raised at oral 
argument. Reeves have not been dilatory in raising the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, sanctions 
are not appropriate. 
For the above reasons, the appeal should be dismissed, or, in the alternative, the cross-
appeal should be reinstated. 
DATED this Z / day of May, 1995. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to the following this 2£f day of May, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
PHILLIP E>lk)WRY, tor: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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